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burse the wife if she has paid them. *Hunt v. Hunt*, 23 Okl. 490, 100 Pac. 541. She has a right to a part of the joint accumulations. *Werner v. Werner*, 59 Kan. 399, 53 Pac. 127. But in some cases these remedies may be grossly inadequate. Some jurisdictions have allowed alimony by statute in certain circumstances. *Barber v. Barber*, 74 Ia. 301, 37 N. W. 381. The same result is being achieved by judicial decision. *Strode v. Strode*, 3 Bush (Ky.) 227. The nondescript allowance, as yet bearing no specific name, takes the same form as alimony; for its size is within the discretion of the court, having regard to all the circumstances. The novelty of the doctrine readily explains the slight confusion with which the principal case achieves a just result.

MORTGAGE — PRIORITIES — SEVERAL NOTES SECURED BY SAME MORTGAGE. — A., the owner of several notes secured by a trust deed, payable two and three years after date, assigned one of the two-year notes to B. and one of the three-year notes to C. The trust deed contained the provision that on default in payment of any of the notes, all should become due. After maturity of all the notes a bill was filed to foreclose the trust deed. *Held*, that all of the two-year notes should be paid first, then the three-year note assigned to C., and then the three-year notes retained by A. *Kuppenheimer v. Chicago Title and Trust Co.*, 43 Nat. Corp. Rep. 467 (Ill., App. Ct., Oct. 4, 1911).

In many jurisdictions the various assignees of notes secured by the same mortgage and maturing at different dates share *pro rata* in a distribution of the security irrespective of the order of maturity or assignment of their respective notes. *Donley v. Hays*, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 400; *Wilson v. Eigenbrodt*, 30 Minn. 4, 13 N. W. 907. In one jurisdiction at least such assignees take priority in the order of assignment. *Cullum v. Erwin*, 4 Ala. 452; *Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Hall*, 58 Ala. 1. A large number of jurisdictions, however, hold that priority shall be determined by the order of maturity of the various notes. *Lyman v. Smith*, 21 Wis. 674; *Winters v. Franklin Bank of Cincinnati*, 33 Oh. St. 250. Nor is this order affected by the presence of an acceleration clause in the mortgage. *Leavitt v. Reynolds*, 79 Ia. 348; *Horn v. Bennett*, 135 Ind. 158, 34 N. E. 321, 956. *Contra*, *Pierce v. Shaw*, 51 Wis. 316, 8 N. W. 209. This view would seem preferable as giving effect to a probable intention of the parties that, by a prior date of maturity, which carries with it, in the absence of an acceleration clause at least, a prior right to foreclose, a party is to be entitled to a preference. The assignee, however, is usually allowed to prevail over the assignor irrespective of the order of maturity. *Parkhurst v. Watertown Steam Engine Co.*, 107 Ind. 594, 8 N. E. 635; *Anderson v. Sharp*, 44 Oh. St. 260, 6 N. E. 900. *Contra*, *Wood v. Trask*, 7 Wis. 566. The principal case illustrates the latter views, except that it prefers the assignor's two-year notes to the assignee's three-year note.

NEGLIGENCE — DUTY OF CARE — DISCONTINUANCE WITHOUT NOTICE OF A CUSTOM OF VOLUNTARILY GIVING WARNING. — The defendant, operating a rock quarry near the plaintiff's blacksmith shop, exploded a blast which frightened a horse being shod by the plaintiff so that it plunged and injured him. At the plaintiff's request, the defendant had habitually warned him before blasting, but on this occasion failed to do so. *Held*, that a complaint alleging these facts states no cause of action. *Hieber v. Central Kentucky Traction Co.*, 140 S. W. 54 (Ky.).

One is not originally obliged to notify a person in the plaintiff's situation before blasting. *Mitchell v. Prange*, 110 Mich. 78, 67 N. W. 1096. But, if he has habitually done so, it does not necessarily follow that the practice can be discontinued without warning. If a railroad, by withdrawing without notice signals from a crossing where they are usually displayed, causes injury to one relying on them, it is liable, though not originally bound to maintain signals

there. *Westaway v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co.*, 56 Minn. 28, 57 N. W. 222; *Burns v. North Chicago Rolling Mill Co.*, 65 Wis. 312, 27 N. W. 43. The court recognizes this rule, but distinguishes the principal case on the ground that the train itself does the injury, while in this case not the blasting but the horse causes it. This distinction, even if true, goes only to the issue of legal cause, one of fact, whereas the difficult point is whether or not the defendant violated a duty. No satisfactory distinction is perceived, and if the railroad cases are right, the propriety of the decision in the principal case may well be doubted. There is, however, a tendency to limit the rule strictly to cases of the crossing-signal type. *O'Leary v. Erie R. Co.*, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 25, 64 N. Y. Supp. 511.

SALES — RISK OF LOSS — CONDITIONAL SALES. — The plaintiff sold the defendant a piano, title to remain in the seller till the price was paid. On the buyer's default after a portion of the price had been paid, the seller replevied the piano. Before termination of the suit the piano was destroyed without fault of the plaintiff. *Held*, that the defendant is not entitled to a return of the payment made. *Hollenberg Music Co. v. Barron*, 140 S. W. 582 (Ark.).

By the weight of authority a retaking of the property on default of the buyer precludes any right to the unpaid purchase price. *Rodgers v. Bachman*, 109 Cal. 552, 42 Pac. 448; *Perkins v. Grobben*, 116 Mich. 172, 74 N. W. 469. But it allows the seller to retain payments already made, since that was the bargain entered into. *Angier v. Taunton Paper Mfg. Co.*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 621. It seems obvious that in this state of the law a destruction of the property could not affect the rights of the parties. A conditional sale, however, should be treated as a mortgage by the buyer to the seller. Consequently the seller should be allowed to retake the property and sue for the purchase price. See WILLISTON, *SALES*, § 579. This has been allowed even when the seller has resold at a loss. *Dederick v. Wolfe*, 68 Miss. 500, 9 So. 350. It would follow that the buyer should also bear the total loss of the property. The seller, then, having a right to the purchase price, might keep payments already made. This view, adopted by the principal case, more accurately defines the rights of the parties, though in the immediate case the result is the same on either view. Under it the seller is forced to take simply as security, and a situation where he might have both the property and most of the purchase price is avoided.

TAXATION — WHERE PROPERTY MAY BE TAXED — SUCCESSION TAX ON SHARES OF JOINT STOCK COMPANY HELD BY NON-RESIDENT. — The decedent, a resident of New Jersey, owned shares in a joint stock company having its principal office in New York. An appeal was taken from an assessment of the stock at full valuation under the Transfer Tax Law of New York on the ground that it should be limited to that proportion of the value of the stock which the assets located in New York bore to the total assets. *Held*, that the appeal should be allowed. *Estate of Willmer*, 46 N. Y. L. J. 853 (N. Y., Surr. Ct., Nov. 22, 1911).

The transfer of corporation stock held by a non-resident may be taxed by the state of incorporation, for the law of that state is called upon to effect it. *Matter of Bronson*, 150 N. Y. 1, 44 N. E. 707. So the full value of the stock may be taxed, regardless of how much of the corporation's property is outside the state. *Matter of Palmer*, 183 N. Y. 238, 76 N. E. 16. It would seem that shares in a joint stock company organized under the laws of the state should be similarly assessed. Though a joint stock company is not a creature of the state as a corporation is, to transfer a share the law of the state is similarly called upon. *Matter of Jones*, 172 N. Y. 575, 65 N. E. 570. The shares are not simply a proportional interest in partnership property. Though the stock company owns only realty, the shares are personalty. *Pittsburg Wagon Works' Estate*, 204 Pa. St. 432, 54 Atl. 316. But the decision is fair. In the analogous